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Evaluating the Reagan  administration  after  20 months in office  is
not an easy task. The data,  good interpretive  studies, the perspective
of time - these are all in short supply. And when it comes to specifics,
there are  the usual  contradictory  trends within  any  administration.
Nevertheless, there is a philosophical position in economic policy that
the Reagan administration  stands for and that I will try to articulate.
I think understanding that philosophy  is at least as important as  ex-
amining specific policies  and their effects.  If the administration  is in
office long  enough, the philosophy  and the policies will converge.
I believe,  also, that the economic  philosophy  of Ronald Reagan has
its roots  in a particular  historical  perspective.  We  will find it useful
to begin by taking a backward glance at the American  economy, from
which we will draw Reaganite  interpretations.  This exercise  is impor-
tant in rendering  any kind of judgment  on the success  of this admin-
istration and its major  policy initiatives,  now and in the future.
An  Historical Sketch
In the mid-1770s the United States was a country of 0.8 of a million
square miles and 2.5 million people, most of whom - 90 to 95 percent
- were  engaged  in  farming.  In  1976,  two  centuries  later,  our  total
area  was  3.6  million  square  miles  - 4.5  times  greater  - and our
population  was  215  million,  of whom  only  8  million  or  3.8  percent
were living on farms. Of these 215 million, about half were descended
from  the  original  2.5  million;  the other  half,  from  immigrants  who
came in great waves  mainly between the  1830s and  the early  1900s.
(This and the  next four paragraphs  draw on Kuznets  (17).)
The best evidence  we have on U.S. per capita real income is that it
increased  during these two centuries by a factor of 12. That is, in 1976
the average American had an income,  corrected  for inflation or defla-
tion, that was 12 times greater than the income of the average Amer-
ican in  1776. Changes  in the quality of commodities consumed make
long-run comparisons  of income,  such as this, rather imprecise.  But it
is safe to say that the 12-fold increase represents at least a lower bound
3to the increase  in goods  and  services available to the average Ameri-
can after the first two centuries  of the republic.
Now, we can gain a rough measure of the growth of the entire econ-
omy - of the  GNP - by combining this information on the growth  of
population with the growth of per capita income. If we simply multiply
the  factor of increase  in  population-  from  2.5 to  215 million  or an
increase of 86-fold in the number of "capitas" - by the 12-fold increase
in income per capita, the capitas  cancel out and we are left with 86  x
12 or approximately  1,000 as the factor of increase in income or, equiv-
alently,  GNP.
On a first approximation,  we can say then, that our economy today
is  1,000  times  greater than  it was in  1776.  Is this  a remarkable  ac-
complishment  and if so,  in what sense? The  compounded annual growth
rate of the GNP is not  itself remarkable - 3.5 percent per year.  The
U.S. personal  saving rate has never  been extraordinarily  high, aver-
aging,  along  a  constant  trend,  about  6.5  or  7  percent  of disposable
personal  income,  though  undergoing  wide  fluctuations  around  that
average.  Nor  is our  present measured  per capita  income  unusual  -
many of the advanced countries - Canada, Australia,  those of North-
ern Europe - approach  it (Kuwait, in fact, exceeds  it).
What is remarkable about the American experience is the high growth
rate  of the population  - 2.25  percent  compounded  annually  - and
the sustained growth of per capita income at 1.25 percent compounded
annually.  An  enormous  number  of people,  starting with  a mere  2.5
million,  entered  into  the  American  growth  process  and  enjoyed  its
fruits.  While the  American  population  was  increasing by  a factor of
86, that of Europe was increasing only 4-fold. And the American growth
was  especially  noteworthy  for the  incredibly  diverse  ethnic  and  cul-
tural background of its participants, most of whom were able to blend
into  the  American  mainstream  without  losing  their  individual  and
group identities.
Several other features of U.S.  economic development are relevant to
the contemporary  debate:
* The growth process was not accompanied  by increasing inequality
of income distribution.  The best  data we  have  seem to indicate  that
the degree of income  inequality,  as reflected  in unadjusted  money  in-
comes, was more or less constant throughout our history. Even though
our unadjusted  money  incomes  are  far from  equal,  constancy  in  the
degree  of inequality  in the  face  of continuing  growth  is  itself a mo-
mentous fact. It means that all groups were pulled along by the growth
process;  that,  in John  F.  Kennedy's  phrase,  "all  ships rose  with  the
tide."  Today's  poor,  today's  rich,  and  the  contemporary  middle class
are all about 12 times better off economically than they were 200 years
ago.  (17)
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propriate  adjustments  to  money  income,  the  degree  of income  ine-
quality has  been  sharply  reduced  since  at  least World  War  II,  and
probably  1929.  Nonmonetary  government  transfers  - particularly
foodstamps,  housing subsidies,  and health services  via Medicare  and
Medicaid  - appear  to  have  accomplished  a  significant  measure  of
redistribution  toward  the  lower  incomes.  (2,3)  Moreover,  when  one
takes  account  of postwar demographic  changes,  such as  the fact that
the lower income earners are to a much greater degree than previously
the very young, the old, and female-headed families - all traditionally
low  earners  - the income distribution  takes  on  a much  more  equal
cast than it ever has before.  Equally noteworthy is the fact that family
size  and the number of wage earners  are both higher for the highest
income quintile  of families  than for  the lowest  quintile  of families.  I
have  told  my students  for  some  years  now that  the quickest way  to
enter the  top income  quintile  is to  be part of an intact family  whose
head  is over  25  and under  65,  and to  make sure that one's spouse  is
employed  and one's daughter has a paper route.  (3)
* Among the major factors driving the growth  of real income in the
United  States  is  technological  change.  Estimates  by various  econo-
mists,  using widely  diverse  methods  over  a  variety  of time periods,
point to technological  change  as the source  of 40  to 50 percent  of the
growth of per capita  real income.  (7,  15)
* Throughout most of our history, the development of the American
economy has been accompanied by a falling general price level. Given
the usual caveat  in making such comparisons,  the consumer price in-
dex was no higher in  1948 than it had been in 1812. Until the 1970s,
the  only  periods  of  sustained  inflation  had  been  those  of wartime.
Apart from occasional  and minor bursts of inflation  in the 1950s  (the
Korean War) and the late 1960s (the Vietnam War), it is doubtful that
a general  price  index which'took  account of product  quality changes
would show that any inflation had occurred in the post-World  War II
period prior to the  early 1970s.  (18,  p.19)
*  Unemployment,  as  a  fraction of the labor force,  has historically
been  high, even  by modern  standards,  running  4  to 5  percent in  the
1860s,  10  percent  in the  1870s,  4  to  5  percent  in the 1880s,  5  to  20
percent  in the  1890s,  5  to  10  percent  in the  1910s,  20 percent  in the
1930s,  and  5  and  6 percent  in the  1950s and  1960s.  This is  partly  a
result  of the high  levels  of immigration,  partly because  of frequent
lapses  into recession  or depression.  (18,  p.22)
*  If we  measure  the stability  of the  economy  by the frequency  of
these recession years,  the American economy has become more  stable
in the  post-World  War  II  period than  it was before.  In the  79 years
from  1866 through  1945,  we  were  in a  National  Bureau-designated
state of recession 30.5 years or 39 percent of the time; from 1946 through
the third quarter of 1982, the recessions add up to  8.5 out of 37 years
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ment  to the  adoption  of automatic  fiscal  stabilizers  and to increased
stability of the money supply due to deposit insurance and an improved
Federal Reserve  performance.
To  summarize  the  growth  process:  In the  first  two  centuries,  the
American  surface  area increased  4.5-fold  and the  population - both
because  of a high birth rate and significant immigration  - increased
86-fold;  the economy  switched  from largely  agrarian  to largely non-
agrarian  and  increased  in  size  1,000-fold;  technological  change  ac-
counted for almost half of this growth; real  income per capita rose 12-
fold across  all  income  groupings;  income  inequality  did not increase
and,  in  fact,  when  adjusted  for  nonmonetary  transfers  and  demo-
graphic changes in recent decades, was significantly reduced; until the
1970s, sustained inflation has occurred almost exclusively in wartime;
unemployment  ratios  have  reflected  the  high immigration  rate  and
frequent  business  fluctuations;  cyclical  instability  has been  sharply
reduced  in the post-World  War II era.
The  Importance of the Individual
The Reaganite interpretation  of American economic history stresses
the  role of the individual  in a decentralized  decision-making process.
Whether  as consumers  or producers,  a free people are  influenced but
not subjugated by their cultural and  social environment; they pursue
self-interest,  seek  information,  make mistakes, learn  from their  mis-
takes, weigh  costs  and  benefits,  and  respond  to market-transmitted
incentives.  Everybody  gains from the resulting trades.
To the extent that property rights are secure, people and capital will
be mobile,  individuals  will invest their  savings,  and the masses will
emerge from poverty on a grand scale. Knowledge, including new tech-
nology, will burgeon,  spurred by the efforts  of thousands of competing
individuals seeking, in a constant trial-and-error process, to maximize
their own rewards.
I  think  both  Adam  Smith,  whose  profile  graces  my  tie,  and  our
founding  fathers foresaw  this  enormous  potential  in a  free economic
system.  They believed  that the fruits  of economic  activity  would be
widely  shared;  that  commercial  transactions,  while  not particularly
meritorious, as such, were a more desirable outlet for human endeavor
than national or religious goals prescribed by central authorities.  (16)
I  do not think James  Madison would  have cared  much  for JFK's ad-
monition that the people  ask themselves what they can do for govern-
ment.
The Role  of Government
But government,  of course,  does  play  a crucial  role  in setting and
enforcing  the  laws  of a  free  society,  including  the  ground  rules for
economic  transactions.  This includes the preservation  of competition,
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that parties in private  exchanges  - for one reason  or  another - ig-
nore. At all times, however, government should follow the free market
credo and  do only what it can  do better than the private sector.
Thus,  while government  can play  a positive role in enforcing  anti-
trust laws and regulating natural monopolies, there is always a danger
that  government  will  apply  anti-trust  against  ultra-successful  com-
petitors, such as A&P and IBM; regulate industries, such as railroads,
producers  of electricity,  and suppliers of long-distance telephone serv-
ice, even after new technologies have deprived them of their monopoly
power;  or  regulate  industries,  such  as  trucking,  buses,  barges,  and
airlines, which seem never  to have had any, or very much, monopoly
power,  even at their origin. In a word,  the existence of market failure
always has to be balanced against the possibility of even greater gov-
ernment failure.
Externalities.  Classic examples  of externalities  are  environmental
pollution,  which  occurs because  individual  property rights  in the en-
vironment  are so weak, and national defense,  which is  a public  good.
A public good is usually defined  as a good whose benefits are predom-
inately external  and which  will thus not be produced  in socially  de-
sired amounts unless government  intervenes.  Another  public good  is
macroeconomic  stability, which the private sector has  no incentive  to
supply.  And, finally,  income equality,  which tends not to  occur in the
private  sector,  may  be  regarded by  the electorate  as  a  worthy  goal,
one that only government  will be able to provide in the desired amount.
As with the regulation of monopoly,  the response by government to
externalities  can be counterproductive.  Schooling, designed to produce
a common language  and culture,  had strong positive  externalities  in
the  19th and early 20th centuries,  when immigration was at its peak.
Publicly  provided  schooling clearly met  the need during that period,
and perhaps beyond. But government enterprises tend to shut out com-
petition,  and  in recent  decades  public  schools  have  become  an egre-
giously uneconomic  and unresponsive  bureaucracy.  The time to break
up the local  school  monopolies (which will invariably  weaken the at-
tendant  teacher-union  monopolies)  and  replace  them,  perhaps,  with
an educational  voucher  system, has arrived.
In spite  of positive  externalities  in universal  low-cost postal deliv-
ery,  it was  almost  certainly  a mistake  from  the beginning  to  grant
government  the  first-class  mail  monopoly.  The  technological  back-
wardness  of the labor-intensive  postal service,  in this age  of comput-
erization,  boggles  the mind.
Government as Pork Barrel. The general  problem, as we  all know,
is that government  favor becomes a socially unintended  alternative to
market  outcome.  Organized  groups  may be able  to improve  mightily
on their market-determined  shares  by putting the heat  on their re-
gionally  elected  representatives.  Unorganized  individuals  may  seek
7out and  find endless sources  of government  largess.
Whether  it be  protection  from  foreign  or  domestic  competitors  by
tariffs and taxes, overt subsidies, covert guarantees,  government  con-
tracts,  government jobs, licensure,  environmental  regulation,  rate  of
return  regulation,  or that  abomination  of our time  - command  and
control  regulation - the gain to  individual supplicants  can  be huge,
while the per-capita social efficiency  loss of each  incremental  govern-
ment  intrusion  or response  is  small  and therefore  tolerable.  But the
aggregate  loss  is  cumulative  and,  over  time, potentially  overwhelm-
ing.
The  Case  for  Income  Redistribution.  None  of the  above  should  be
taken  as a  denial  of the  legitimacy  of conscious  and  above-board  in-
come redistribution  as a social goal. While  some may see market out-
comes as those  of a meritocracy,  others may perceive a larger, rather
than a smaller, element  of luck in the results, which are therefore  not
sacrosanct.  And regardless of luck, one may regard the direct market
rewards  and punishments  as too severe.  (24)  The difficulty,  however,
is that while we know  something about our growth process, we know
very little about how to influence the progress of whole ethnic or social
groups.  The risk of doing more harm than good is not small.
An  Alternative  Model  of Human  Nature.  The  only  way  to  under-
stand much  of the command and control variety of regulation,  as well
as  any  number  of other proposed  and  de facto  government  economic
interventions  to  which  Reaganomics  is  a reaction,  is to examine  the
extreme  interventionist view of human behavior.  That view stands at
opposite poles to that of Adam Smith, the American founding fathers,
and what I  prefer to think  of as  the characteristic  Reaganite  percep-
tion. The extreme  interventionist view denies the premise  of free and
reasonably informed human action; it presumes that consumers, work-
ers, and "small" business  people are passively  influenced  by the  self-
serving  decisions of large corporate enterprise  which, through  adver-
tising,  control  of the media,  and  various  other manipulations,  deter-
mines  consumer  tastes, wages,  and working  conditions.  (12)  Market
demand and labor supply curves have no independent status. They are
fixed by external  forces  and can and should be dislodged only by gov-
ernment mandate.
This view of the market economy,  of the breakdown of participatory,
Smithonian economic  democracy,  stands in stark contrast to the usual
view of political  democracy.  In  the political realm,  these same  indi-
viduals  who  are  helpless  victims  of their  economic  masters  are  be-
lieved able to cope, somehow, when they cast ballots instead of dollars;
to  do  so with reasonably  good judgment,  incomplete  but adequate in-
formation,  and a long-run  ability to see through most of the abuses  of
the truth committed under protection  of the First Amendment.  (5)
The Regulatory Approach and Its Hazards. The view that the people
have simply failed in their exercise  of economic  freedom and therefore
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to the free market economy. Whether it be idiot consumers or exploited
workers,  a benevolent government,  miraculously  free of any perverse
incentives  or  misperceptions  of its own,  must rescue  the people  and
impose appropriate  standards,  such as safety in the workplace,  safety
and demonstrated  effectiveness  in pharmaceutical products,  safety  in
automobiles, and "affirmative  action" - a kissing cousin to quotas
in employment.  Government must redirect capital to new energy sources,
mass transit, and daycare centers. Government must develop  low-cost
housing,  underwrite  health  services  and provide  old  age  insurance,
determine the minimum  compulsory  age  of retirement  in public and
private  employment, and furnish public service jobs to those who can-
not find them in the market economy.  In a word, there isn't anything
the government can't  do better than the private sector.
A  conceptual  failure inherent  in these kinds of government  initia-
tives  is, of course, their premise that most people  cannot handle their
economic  freedom and are not responsive to economic  incentives.  It is
a false premise. The result is that endless government programs suffer
from that aptly named economic  malady, moral hazard. Moral hazard
refers  to the tendency  of private or public measures designed to achieve
certain  objectives  to  promote,  through  perverse  incentives,  the very
opposite of what they intend.
Thus government-subsidized  flood insurance  lowers the cost of new
construction  on the flood plains and so encourages it among  rational,
cost-conscious  citizens; auto safety devices reduce the cost of accidents
and thereby promote  reckless driving;  safety and effectiveness  regu-
lation of drugs imposes severe punishment on regulators who approve
defective drugs  and ignores the costs of delay in introducing effective
drugs, thereby creating a review process so protracted that more lives
may be lost than saved by any improved features of the drugs; (27, pp.
28-29)  government-subsidized  health services  are provided  at low, third-
party-funded costs, fostering vastly increased use of such services; un-
employment  benefits  lower  the  cost  of unemployment  and  generate
unemployment;  (9) anti-poverty  programs create poverty and depend-
ency; requiring employers to pay greater workmen-compensation  ben-
efits reduces  the cost of accidents to workers and increases the industrial
accident  rate;  (4,  pp.  45-46)  granting  air traffic  controllers  generous
retirement benefits based on stress on the job, where stress was defined
as responsibility for near misses of aircraft, resulted in a statistically
significant increase  in near misses;  (28)  and on and on and on.
An early pioneering study by Sam Peltzman indicated that the 1962
Amendments to the Food and Drug Act, strengthening safety require-
ments for drugs and requiring proof of their efficacy, created a review
lag that  is  nothing  less than  a national  scandal  (the average  lag is
now  8  years).  (25)  There  was,  moreover,  no  identifiable  increase  in
drug effectiveness,  the primary goal  of the amendments.
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standards  were  promoting  what he  euphemistically  called  more  "in-
tensive" driving  and a consequent higher accident rate.  Occupants  of
cars  were indeed  surviving at a higher rate in view of the  safety fea-
tures,  but pedestrians  and bike  riders were  dying  in increased  num-
bers about equal  to the reduction  in occupant fatalities.  (26)
I  used  to caution  my  students  that  the  studies  by  Peltzman  and
others  were only  the first word on the  subject, not the last; the  econ-
ometric  techniques  could  be  improved;  and time would tell  how well
the variables  had been controlled.  Well, for a long time Peltzman and
his  colleagues  had the  only  word  on  the  subject.  In  time,  criticisms
appeared  and  misspecifications  were  uncovered  in  the  original  for-
mulations,  but the  broad conclusions  of these  studies have  generally
remained intact. (31) The social reformers have a great deal to answer
for. If I were a demagogue,  I would say they have blood on their hands.
Even in the absence  of moral hazard, government  agencies are sim-
ply unqualified  to  carry out  the myriad tasks assigned  to them.  Gov-
ernment  efforts  to counter the  decline  of the  cities have  been utterly
uninformed,  oblivious  to the  underlying  mechanism  that  might  be
transforming  the  cities.  Ignoring  the  forces  that propel  populations
out  of the  cities  and  from  one  region  of the  country  to another  has
resulted  in  government's  utter  failure  to  reverse  or  ameliorate  the
process, in spite of endless expenditures.
I have  seen no  evidence  that agricultural  programs  have stabilized
farm income over any extended period of time; that farm price supports
have  helped  poor  farmers  instead of rich ones  or done  anything  but
delay temporarily,  at considerable  expense  to taxpayers,  the inexora-
ble movement  of resources  off the land.
Reaganomics:  Regulatory  Reform
I do not mean to suggest that dissatisfaction with proliferating  gov-
ernment programs which could not pass a simple cost-benefit test was
an exclusive  Reaganite  insight.  On the  contrary,  the  first stirring  of
regulatory  reform began in the aborted  second Nixon administration,
which itself had been responsible  for some of the worst command and
control regulation of the decade  - the Clean Air Act of 1970  and the
creation of the notorious Occupational  Safety and Health Administra-
tion in the same year.  Under  Gerald  Ford, regulatory  reform  gained
momentum among the young economists  of the Council on  Wage and
Price Stability (COWPS). And then, because the deregulation of trans-
portation had become  a bipartisan cause, the regulatory reform move-
ment came to fruition under Jimmy Carter. A good part of the reason
for this development was the man Carter  chose to head the Civil Aer-
onautics  Board  (CAB),  the  agency  responsible  for  rates,  routes,  and
the privilege  of supplying  interstate air transportation.  The man,  of
course, was Alfred Kahn, who shares the platform with me this morn-
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determine  rates  and routes was  permitted  under the  law.  He  boldly
went about dismantling the government-controlled  cartel of air trans-
port, which,  in its  38 years,  had refused to accept  a single new entry
to the industry, in spite of hundreds of applications.  By 1978, Congress
had passed enabling legislation to complete the job, establishing a time
table  for  the total phaseout  of the  CAB.  I  believe this  was  the first
major  peacetime  government  agency  to  be  dissolved  - not  merely
transferred  to another department.
Fred Kahn did not himself complete  the task at CAB, having been
asked to chair COWPS in 1978. But his able successor, Marvin Cohen,
presided  over  the remainder  of the dismantling  operation.  In  1979
another disciple of Fred's,  Darius Gaskins, who had been at the CAB
but was then my own boss in the Energy Policy office,  was appointed
chairman  of the Interstate  Commerce  Commission (ICC), whose  reg-
ulatory  scope  extends  to  railroads,  trucks,  and  interstate  waterway
transportation.  Gaskins had little more than a year on the job to start
dismantling the federal surface cartels, and he did so with intelligence
and vigor.
However,  the deregulation  was unfinished  when  Carter  left office
and it fell to the new administration to continue it. Under the Reagan-
appointed  ICC  chairman,  Reese  Taylor,  a  man  acceptable  to  the
Teamsters,  there has been  a  decided  slowing  down in  the  decontrol
pace and much wringing of hands by free-market economists who mon-
itor these things.  (23)
The President's  swift handling of the Air Traffic  Controllers' strike
in August 1981  was a commendable action whose ultimate payoff will
be considerable.  Public  employee  unions,  such  as  those of the postal
workers, have driven wages well  above competitive private-sector  lev-
els.  (1) One negative  aspect of the government's firing  of striking  air
controllers,  however,  has been the partial reregulation  of airport traffic
and airline routing as part of the adjustment to temporarily  reduced
air traffic control capability.
Environment,  Energy,  and  Natural  Resources.  There  have  been
other deregulation  disappointments  thus far in the Reagan  adminis-
tration.  The  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  has begun  to
show  some  desired  flexibility  in determining  specific  pollutant  emis-
sion levels, but has basically continued to perpetuate detailed uniform
standards  for existing sources  and uniform technology-specific  stand-
ards for new facilities.  There has been little progress toward a decen-
tralized market-based  system of emission  charges  or, where  feasible,
marketable pollution rights.  (6) Either of these techniques  would per-
mit firms for  whom the  cost was lowest to carry  out the lion's share
of abatement with technology  of their own choosing.
The  Clean  Air  Act  is  the  supreme  bureaucratic  law,  mandating
standards  for thousands of different pollution sources that differ with
11respect to endless characteristics,  such as regional location,  age of the
equipment, and the surrounding  air quality.  The administrative  task
is  so horrendous  that  the  EPA has been  unable  to  establish  all the
standards,  as  yet,  or  develop  adequate  enforcement  procedures.  The
present  administration  has hardly  begun  to develop  the initiative of
the  Ford administration,  which allowed  firms to buy pollution rights
from other firms in dirty air regions, leaving  the total emission level
unchanged;  or the "bubble" policy of the Carter administration,  which
allowed  a  given firm to  allocate  a constant  total amount  of emission
among  its separate  plants,  as  it  sees  fit.  Both  initiatives  have  been
shown  to save firms many millions  of dollars.
One of the most positive deregulatory  actions taken by the Reagan
administration was its removal of the remaining controls on oil prices
and allocations  in January  1981.  I will not recount the details of our
long nightmare with oil price controls and allocations.  But since I was
personally  involved with them, let me only remind  you that the con-
trols  taxed  domestic  oil,  subsidized  imports  of oil,  subsidized  small
inefficient refiners, and imposed Byzantine mandatory allocations that
bore no  resemblance  to  optimal  petroleum  use or to  any  elementary
notions of equity.
Once  again,  the  initiative  for  decontrol  began  under  the  Carter
administration,  which,  under  the  law,  began  a  gradual  30-month
phaseout. The decontrol was combined with the windfall profits tax -
actually an excise tax - which  I felt was overdone.  For one thing, it
should never  have been applied  to  newly  produced, oil,  and the legis-
lation  by Congress last summer to  reduce the tax on  new oil by one-
half is a desirable  amendment.
As almost his first official  act, President Reagan  pulled the plug on
the eight  months remaining  on  the  oil  controls  and  did  us  and the
entire free  world an enormous  favor.  If only  he could  have  contrived
to do the  same thing for natural gas prices!  There has, however, been
no movement to accelerate  the slow and painful deregulatory  process
of natural gas.
Meanwhile,  a little over a year later, the President successfully  ve-
toed  a  Republican-led  attempt  to  reimpose  the  oil  regulations  as  a
standby emergency  measure.  But what the President failed to do was
to  embrace  a competing  bill,  sponsored by Senators  Bill Bradley  and
Charles Percy.  That bill urged the avoidance of oil controls under any
circumstances  and required  the president to move aggressively  to build
up  the Strategic  Petroleum  Reserve,  design  a  strategy  for  its  draw-
down,  and  prepare  a plan for recycling windfall-profits  tax revenues
to  low-income  families.  What the administration  has not faced  up to
is that it takes more planning to avoid intervention in disrupted mar-
kets than it does to intervene. The non-intervention has to be planned
in every feasible detail and simulated with respect to likely consumer,
producer,  Congressional,  and media reactions. There is no other prac-
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shocks.  (13)
One  of President  Reagan's  finest  hours  was  his early  decision  to
withdraw  from  the tentative  agreement  on  the  Law  of the  Sea  and
then,  this year, to renounce  the final document.  The  Law of the Sea
governs the mining of minerals on the world sea bed and arranges for
the distribution  of a portion of the revenues among Third World coun-
tries.  As drawn  up during a  16-year period  by an international  com-
mission  to  which  four  administrations  - two  Democratic  and  two
Republican  - sent representatives,  the Law of the Sea establishes a
highly  paid bureaucracy  in Switzerland,  sets strict production quotas
on the minerals,  fixes prices, and transfers  eventual  billions in reve-
nues to the governments  of the less developed world. It creates, poten-
tially,  a super  cartel  that could  dwarf anything  the  world has  ever
seen. How lucky we are that there was not some nice guy running the
State Department who could urge another nice guy in the Oval Office
to sign it.
I know less about land use policy, but I do have an inner conviction
that U.S. governmental units hold far too much territory - more than
one-third of our land surface, by one count.  I do not believe the federal
government  in  this  century  has  been  a  trustworthy  steward  of the
land,  allocating it to its most valued uses. By opening wilderness  and
offshore  areas to oil, gas, and other minerals exploration,  James Watt
is moving in the right direction.  Given the rarity of big mineral finds,
it is  important that  large areas  be put  up  for lease.  What  counts  is
that the private sector have an opportunity to evaluate areas as large
as  possible - areas,  which  it is  not,  in  any  case,  likely to  lease  in
overwhelming  amounts.
Other Deregulatory Initiatives. There have been other hopeful signs
of the resurgence  of economic reasoning in regulatory policy. The Fed-
eral  Trade  Commission is trying to establish a rational course  which
fulfills its anti-trust mandate while avoiding the anti-advertising zeal-
otry  of the Carter team.  The  Consumer  Product  Safety  Commission
has been curtailed,  and I believe,  for good reason, since  its aggregate
effort  is unlikely to pass a cost-benefit  evaluation.  (32, p.25) The Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration has sought to limit some
of its dubious previous  initiatives,  though was recently  overruled  on
the air bags by a court decision.  The Justice Department  dropped its
long  festering  case  against IBM,  allowing full  competition  to return
to that  industry.  Ma  Bell  has been  dismembered,  more  or less,  cur-
tailing its monopoly  and opening the door  to more  competition in te-
lecommunications,  though not, I think,  as much as was possible.
Overall, the Reagan record on deregulation  or regulation - where
called  for - of industry  and natural resources  has some pluses  and
minuses.  The  pluses  are important  - the government  is essentially
out  of the conventional  oil  business,  it has  squelched  the notorious
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- both of which  are simply uneconomic  - and  put some  rationality
into anti-trust.  But the minuses  are also  significant - the failure to
proceed  swiftly with surface transport deregulation,  to turn EPA into
an economically  based  activity,  and  to  accelerate natural  gas decon-
trol.
Having  said  all  that,  I  think  we should  take the  administration's
claim seriously  that it has reduced  the  size  of the  monthly  Federal
Register, the compendium of all newly issued regulations,  to a shadow
of its former  self.  That is an accomplishment,  which,  in the long run,
will match  and perhaps  surpass Jerry  Ford's  53  glorious  vetoes  and
the  New  Deal-type  initiatives that made  no  sense  in the  1950s  and
which  Dwight  Eisenhower  never  permitted  to  see  the  light of day.
We'll never know, but should  always appreciate,  the endless mischief
that the Departments  of Energy,  Education, Labor,  and Housing and
Urban Development  - to name  only four - could have promulgated
in a friendlier environment,  but weren't permitted to.
Reagan  Macroeconomics
I've left the toughest part for last. In its first 20 months the Reagan
administration  has been  preoccupied  with inflation,  budgetary  defi-
cits, astronomical  interest rates,  and high unemployment.  These ma-
cro  magnitudes  all  supersede  regulatory  issues  in the  minds  of the
voters; bringing them under control is no less consistent with the cir-
cumstances  of our  economic  development  of the  past  two  centuries.
Ronald Reagan  had  made an issue  out of all of these variables  in the
1980 campaign, promising  to reduce them all, along with taxes, while
at the same time increasing  defense expenditures.
I don't know if anyone really believed that it was possible to accom-
plish these goals quickly and simultaneously.  But the political rhetoric
played  down the tradeoffs  - for example,  between inflation  and em-
ployment  that  is  involved  in  an  anti-inflationary  policy.  Ideological
support  from supply  siders and expectationists  filled in remaining holes
in the argument  to  produce  the following  scenario:  The tax cuts,  in-
volving both consumers  and producers  and average  and marginal rates,
would stimulate greater  work effort, saving, and investment. These in
turn would  generate  income  and  offset  a good part  of the  loss  of tax
revenues,  as claimed by the  Laffer hypothesis.
Moreover,  discretionary federal spending would be pared to the bone
to balance the increase in defense spending and contain any remaining
deficit. Should the deficit, nevertheless, temporarily balloon, monetary
tightness,  already  in force,  would be maintained to keep the inflation
in  tow.  However,  interest  rates,  which  are  sustained  at high  levels
mainly  by inflationary expectations,  would plunge as savers, borrow-
ers, and wealth holders all quickly  responded to the  administration's
vigorous  pro-supply and anti-inflation  posture.
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a  hitch.  Few  expected  the  President  to  push  a  substantial  tax  cut
through the Congress in his first year. Even fewer believed that spend-
ing could be reduced to a significant degree, particularly with the rise
in defense  spending  that the voters  wanted and  were  likely to get.  I
think a lot of people  believed,  however, that if taxes could be cut, this
would  act  as a  constraint forcing  Congress  sooner  or later to curtail
spending.
When,  in the early  summer of 1981,  it seemed  as  if the President
might indeed get his tax cut, the prevailing commonsensical  view was
that  each building  block in the President's  program  should be  prag-
matically  accepted  and the next  installment  sought  in  its turn, not
before.  This seemed particularly justified by the fact that the negoti-
ated tax package  and the rise in defense spending would take several
years  to  be  fully  effective,  giving  the  administration  ample  time  to
hack  away at the social programs  and the general pork barrel.
The  tax package  finally  agreed upon  reduced  the maximum  mar-
ginal rate on individual income  from 70 percent to 50 percent and the
withholding rate on all individual income 5 percent in fiscal  1982  and
10 percent in both 1983  and 1984. Business tax relief took the form of
more  rapid write-off for  capital equipment  and a liberalization  of the
investment tax credit.
While the personal tax reductions were significant, their impact was
more or less fully offset by the simultaneous  increase in the inflation
"bracket creep"  for  the majority  of taxpayers  plus  the  scheduled  in-
crease in Social Security taxes. (21) However, an important - perhaps
the most important - feature of the act, which goes into effect in 1985,
ends bracket  creep by indexing  the income tax brackets  and the per-
sonal exemption - i.e.,  adjusting them annually for inflation.
By the late fall of 1981 it became clear that the economy had entered
a new recession  four or five months earlier and the new tax law was
having  no  effect on  long-term  interest rates,  which remained  at his-
toric  high levels.  Short-term  rates fell  moderately,  as  did the prime
rate,  but all three remained  incredibly  high,  even  after subtracting
the inflation rate.
At the same time, the recession and the interest rates being paid on
the federal debt - not the tax cuts - were together causing the deficit
to mushroom. The 1980 deficit had been $60 billion, but for fiscal  1982,
the deficit was running at more  than twice that amount  and  will, in
fact, be about $115 billion for the fiscal year ending this month. While
deficits  in a  recession  are  not  a bad  idea,  the projections  by almost
everyone for the next three years in a moderately recovering  economy
placed the annual deficit at $150 to $160  billion or more. This terrified
government  economists  and absolutely  panicked  the  director  of the
Office of Management and Budget who was transformed into a Keynes-
ian on the spot!
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billion  will  equal  4  percent  of a $4  trillion  GNP.  (10)  He attributes
half of that deficit to the deficit of 2  percent of GNP which the admin-
istration inherited when it took office. Of the remaining 2 percent,  1.5
percent  is  explained  by the  1981  reduction  in business  and personal
taxes (.75 percent due to each).  An assumed 7 percent annual increase
in  defense  spending  would  increase the  1984  deficit by  1 percent  of
the  GNP,  but  Feldstein  assumes  that  cuts  in  nondefense  spending
offset half of that.  Feldstein proposed  delaying the July  1983  10  per-
cent tax cut over an additional year or two, but not otherwise altering
the  1981  law.
In the summer  of 1982  the administration  and  Congress  chose  in-
stead  to raise taxes by,  among other things, requiring  withholding  of
dividends and  interest, taxing telephone calls and cigarettes,  restrict-
ing medical  deductions,  limiting the  investment tax credit,  repealing
the further accelerated depreciation  scheduled  for 1985 and  1986, and
repealing the ability of companies with unused tax credits to transfer
them  to  other  firms  through  equipment  leasing.  This  act  was  esti-
mated  to raise  $98  billion  by  1985,  and more  beyond  that.  It  offset
about a fourth of the  1981 cuts.  However,  it left intact the  1981  indi-
vidual  income tax reductions  and most,  but unfortunately,  not all  of
the business benefits while tilting toward consumption taxes and tight-
er collection procedures.
The effect of the tax increase  will, of course,  be to reduce  consump-
tion  and increase  saving,  out  of which  a  portion  of the  government
deficit can  be funded.  This will leave  more saving for current  invest-
ment.  While taxes  are  not ordinarily  raised  in a  recession,  doing  so
now enables  the money  supply to  be loosened somewhat  and interest
rates to decline.  This tradeoff between fiscal and monetary anti-infla-
tionary polices provides a welcome measure of monetary relief.
A Macro Evaluation.  How do we assess the administration's  macro
policies  in light of our history  and what  I  have  identified as  the  Re-
aganite interpretation  of that history? Clearly the government budget,
like the impact of government regulatory policy, had gone well beyond
anything  that  might  be  recognized  as  an  externality  in  the private
sector.  One can  make a case  for the payment  of unemployment  com-
pensation and  food  stamps to individuals  whose jobs are temporarily
lost in  cyclical  downturns  or in swings  in international  comparative
advantage.  In fact,  a  simple  negative  income  tax,  for  all its demon-
strated  negative  incentives,  would  certainly  be  an  administratively
superior and less costly  approach to all such subsidies,  including wel-
fare and other income redistributive  measures.
But the bulk  of government  budgetary  activity  has demonstrated
government's  inability to function in a controlled  and disciplined fash-
ion. Civil service and military pensions are a scandal.  Social Security
has become the largest grab bag of all, over-indexed,  overly generous
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to major demographic  changes that are under way. The private sector
could have done it a thousand times better.  Federally subsidized Med-
icare and Medicaid  have  thrown fiscal  control and individual respon-
sibility  to the  winds  in  a  sector  that,  contrary  to  mythology,  could
function  competitively,  like  any other,  in the  absence  of restraining
regulations - both public and private.  There  are a myriad of federal
spending programs  in education, transportation,  and housing that make
no sense at all.
Has  Reagan  macroeconomics  fumbled  the  ball?  I  don't  think  so.
Twenty months into the administration we have a $115  billion deficit,
which  is just about  right for the recession we are in.  We have gotten
some  tax reform  for  individuals  and businesses that  will  eventually
count for a great deal.  The efforts  to trim the budget have  not made
a serious inroad into the social programs  and other dubious expendi-
tures, but at least  many of the outlays have stopped growing - more
than  we  realize,  as  anybody  (like myself)  who  feeds  on  government
research  contracts  surely  knows.  And  the underlying  inflation  rate
has dropped smartly - from  9 and  10 percent  in  1979  and  1980 to 5
percent and under in 1982.  That is a major accomplishment,  one that
this  and the preceding  administration,  through  its initiation  of the
tight money  policy, can claim credit for.
If anything  went wrong, it was  a failure to understand  the under-
lying macroeconomics,  while building up naive  expectations  about what
the policies  could be expected  to accomplish  in a short period of time.
The supply siders and Lafferites may have a piece of the truth, but no
sense of time dimension.  We don't really know whether lower personal
taxes  and higher  disposable  incomes,  on  net, increase  work effort  or
the savings  ratio. Economists  have  known  for years  about the back-
ward bending labor supply curve, whereby households may respond to
higher earnings by working  less and enjoying more  leisure..  The sav-
ings ratio, as I noted earlier,  fluctuates around an incredibly constant
trend under the most diverse  circumstances.  (30)  And while  the  ab-
solute level  of investment will eventually respond to accelerated  cost
write-off,  one should  not anticipate very much new investment while
industry  is still operating  at 70 percent  of capacity.
The  belief that interest  rates  are primarily  an expectational  phe-
nomenon  and would plunge as soon  as the  1981 tax cuts were  passed
was obviously wide of the mark. As Feldstein (11)  has pointed out, the
impact  of inflationary expectations  on interest rates and other varia-
bles  is  a very  gradual  process.  In  addition,  interest  rates are  deter-
mined by many  things, not the least of which is the rate of monetary
growth.  Short-term rates, in particular,  which are little influenced by
expectations  of any kind, are  heavily  influenced  by monetary policy,
which,  since the  beginning of 1980, has been on the longest course  of
stringency in the postwar  or probably  any other period.  The tax cut,
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tionary expectations  downward and thereby  exerting downward  pres-
sure  on  the  long-term  rate.  Moreover,  when  one  looks  at  the  1981
deficit, adds in off-budget federal borrowings and federally-guaranteed
loans, the grand total comes to 79 percent of total savings, the highest
such  percentage  in 20 years  and possibly  in history.  (19)  There  is no
mystery about the level of interest rates or their failure to fall rapidly.
The Role of Monetary Policy.  The major macro policy of this admin-
istration and the preceding administration,  in its last year, is, of course,
the tight money policy. In  1980 the money  supply failed,  for the first
time  in perhaps  20 years, to rise responsively  with the federal deficit
and  the  rise  in federal-related  borrowings.  (20)  The  great monetary
restriction had begun.
While I am not a narrow monetarist, the fact remains that persistent
inflation,  even  if not  caused by  monetary  expansion,  can be  brought
under  control  by  a  slowing  of the monetary  growth  rate.  This  is  a
particularly effective method in our political system in which the Fed-
eral  Reserve  is insulated  from political  pressures  and  the only  alter-
native, fiscal  policy,  is a very inflexible  tool.
Moreover, whatever  policy we use to curtail  inflation, there has never
been a recorded  instance  in which the  anti-inflation  policy  has failed
to create recession and unemployment  in its wake.  The reason is sim-
ple.  As Herb  Stein  (29)  explains  it:  if total spending  has been rising
at  12  percent  per  year,  with  the  price  level  rising at  9  percent  and
output at 3  percent,  a slowdown  in spending  to 5  percent  would,  ide-
ally,  reduce  the inflation  to  2  percent  and permit  output to continue
to grow  3  percent.  In practice,  however,  the inflation rate would fall
much less than the ideal  7 percent,  owing to contractual  obligations
and informal  commitments  to price and wage increases that reflected
the previous  experience  with high inflation.  The reduction  in money
and spending  would thus  fall  disproportionately  on  real  output  and
employment,  the more so the greater the monetary  contraction.
There is, unfortunately,  no effective  way to avoid the recession.  Those
who  assert  that  we  are  using  unemployment  to  fight  inflation  are
being demagogic.  The  fact, rather,  is that the  attempt to bring  infla-
tion under  control in virtually  every instance  and every  country that
has ever tried to do  so has resulted in an unavoidable  lapse from full
employment.  (22)  We  simply  don't know how to prevent  the  induced
recession.  We  might,  of course,  impose  a  very  gradual  monetary  re-
striction which would attempt to bring the inflation under control with
minimal  impact  on  economic  activity.  It  is,  however,  very  unlikely
that such a policy would be maintained for the requisite  period or that
the private  sector would find  the government's  anti-inflation  posture
very persuasive.  We  could, at the other  extreme,  make  the monetary
contraction  so severe  as  to try to  get the job  done  more  quickly.  But
this risks a cumulative downturn and puts all politicians instantly out
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impeached  or recalled.  (29)
There  is, finally,  a third alternative,  which is to  impose wage  and
price controls or an incomes policy with teeth in it during the monetary
contraction.  In principle,  this  is not an illogical  policy.  It is  the only
circumstance  in which general  controls or guidelines make any sense
at all: the ongoing rise of demand is being slowed and the supply side
of the system needs  to learn quickly that its old pricing pattern is no
longer  appropriate  and,  if pursued,  will  cost  it  dearly.  One  way  to
communicate  that fact  is to impose a policy that simply restrains the
general  increase  of wages  and  prices.  The problem,  of course, is that
we  have  rarely, if ever,  been able  to  use controls  in so well-targeted
and selective a manner.  The 1971  freeze was utterly uncalled for and
served simply to mask  rising demand  forces, and later to impede the
adjustment  of the economy to the world energy  shock. I don't feel that
the Carter incomes policy  was  any more  successful,  serving  in 1979-
1980  to inhibit resource  reallocations  that would have mitigated the
second energy  disruption. In view of the energy  shock,  I also think it
was  a  mistake  to initiate tight money  in  1980.  Independent  supply-
side  disturbances,  such  as  an  energy  shortfall,  should  be  accommo-
dated by a somewhat  looser,  not tighter monetary policy.(14)
Incomes  policies, in practice,  are just too blunt, too  inflexible,  and
ill-timed.  They have  ended up  doing more  harm than  good.  In brief,
the government  failure of incomes policies exceeds the market failure
- the recession  - caused by tight money.
I think the administration  should stick to its guns. The recession is
bad, but not as  bad  as the  popular  perception  of it.  To  compare  the
current  9.8  percent  unemployment  rate  in  any  way  to the  1930s  is
misleading.  Today  we  are  several times  more  affluent,  we  have  un-
employment insurance, and 57 percent of the working age population
are employed,  compared  to just  over 58 percent  before  the  recession.
In 1933, there was no insurance and only 44 percent had jobs, relative
to 57 percent  in 1929.  (8, pp.266-268)
The Reagan macro policies have  bought us time, while achieving  a
significant reduction  in the inflation rate  and a good start on tax re-
ductions and tax reform.  In the future we will  either modify our en-
titlements programs  to make them affordable or we will have to raise
taxes or give up on the anti-inflation effort.  Once this fall's election is
over, Ronald Reagan will have another opportunity to lead the way to
budgetary  discipline,  and  responsible  members  of both  parties  will
again provide  the necessary  support.
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